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EPA'S SAFETY VALVE TO REMAIN OPEN
To remedy the problem of increasingly polluted navigable and drinking
waters, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) of 1948.' Due to heightened public environmental awareness
Congress subsequently passed several amendments2 that empowered the fed-
eral government to play a more substantial role in creating and enforcing
stringent uniform standards of performance3 for dischargers.4 In the 1972
amendments,' known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), Congress delegated
the responsibility of promulgating national effluent limitations6 and pretreat-
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat.
1155 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)). For the pur-
poses of the Act, the term "navigable waters" is defined as "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). For an examination of the legal
development of this term, see Barker, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899:
Potent Tools for Environmental Protection, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 109, 115-24 (1976).
2. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text.
3. Congress defined "standard of performance" as
a standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest
degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable
through application of the best available demonstrated control technology, processes,
operating methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard
permitting no discharge of pollutants.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 306(1), 86
Stat. 816, 854 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
4. "Direct dischargers" are parties that discharge waste water directly into navigable
waters of the United States; "indirect dischargers" are parties that introduce pollutants into
publicly owned treatment works. Telephone interview with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in
Technical Support Branch of the EPA Office of Water (July 26, 1985).
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)) [hereinafter
cited as the Clean Water Act].
6. "The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction established by a State or the
Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and
other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters
of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." Clean Water Act,
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1982). "Effluent limitations" and "effluent standards" will be
used interchangeably to mean the national guidelines for dischargers promulgated by the EPA.
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ment standards7 for categories of pollutants8 and point sources9 to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA).' ° Congress passed additional
amendments in 197711 that directed the EPA to place still greater restric-
tions on the discharge of toxic pollutants.
12
Because of unclear statutory language and ambiguity in the legislative his-
tory of many CWA provisions, 3 the EPA frequently has had to defend its
discretionary actions in court.' 4 In addressing these CWA statutory con-
struction disputes, federal courts' interpretations often conflict.' 5
The most challenged provision is the "Fundamentally Different Factor"
variance (FDF variance). 6 The EPA included this variance in the regula-
tions as a safety valve to allow alteration of individual limitations or stan-
dards when an atypical discharger is fundamentally different from those
considered in establishing the national effluent limitations or pretreatment
7. Pretreatment standards apply to indirect dischargers on an industry-by-industry basis.
Their purpose is to prevent pollutants that cannot be treated or that would interfere with
treatment operations from entering publicly owned treatment works or passing through to
navigable waters untreated. Clean Water Act, § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). Di-
rect and indirect dischargers are covered by different provisions in the Clean Water Act, but
the two groups' standards are generally comparable. See infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
8. "The term 'pollutant' means dredged soil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materi-
als, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal and
agricultural waste discharged into water." Clean Water Act, § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)
(1982).
9. "Point source" refers to: "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, includ-
ing but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged." Clean Water Act, § 502(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(1982).
10. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970). Prior to the creation of the
EPA, several federal agencies were responsible for water pollution control, including the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Administration. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
11. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
12. The term "toxic pollutant" includes:
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents,
which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation into
any organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion
through food chains, will, on the basis of information available to the Administrator,
cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiologi-
cal malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations,
in such organism or their offspring.
Clean Water Act, § 502(13), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1982).
13. See infra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 102-07, 134, 151-80, and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
16. 40 C.F.R. pt. 125, subpt. D (1985).
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standards.' 7 Disputes arose prior to the 1977 amendments in relation to
FDF variances for direct dischargers." The issue of variance for direct dis-
chargers was temporarily resolved in E. . du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train'9 when the United States Supreme Court held that the EPA had au-
thority under section 301 of the CWA to limit discharges by existing plants
through industry-wide regulations.2" The EPA was to base these regulations
on classes and categories of pollutants and point sources, establishing uni-
form effluent limitations for both the 1977 and 1983 deadlines.2 However,
the Court stipulated that the EPA must include a procedure for taking into
consideration variation in individual plants.22
The Supreme Court, unwilling to define the limits of the FDF variance in
du Pont,2 3 gave the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) the
opportunity recently to question the scope of such a variance in light of sec-
tion 301(1).24 The NRDC asserted that Congress did not intend for the
EPA to issue any variances, waivers, or modifications from the prescribed
standards for toxic pollutant dischargers.25 In response, the EPA contended
that "modification" was a term of art in the CWA, and that FDF variances
were not modifications of standards, but rather were the creation of a more
appropriate standard based on unique characteristics previously overlooked
by the EPA.26 In addition, the EPA interpreted section 301(l) only to pro-
17. Fundamentally Different Factors Variances for Direct Dischargers in the NPDES Per-
mitting System (Draft) March 1982 at 2.
18. See infra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
19. 430 U.S. 112 (1977). See infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
20. 430 U.S. at 128.
21. In the 1972 amendments Congress set deadlines by which direct dischargers were to
meet the technologically based standards created by the EPA. By 1977 dischargers were to
have achieved the "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT). Clean
Water Act, § 301(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(A) (1982). By 1983 direct dischargers were
required to achieve the "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT). Clean
Water Act, § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982). In the 1977 amendments, the
deadline for BAT was changed.
The implementation of BPT standards was the first stage in reducing pollutants through
installation by 1977 of pollution-control devices at the point of discharge or end of the plants'
processes. BAT standards were instead aimed at reducing the amount of pollutants ultimately
discharged throughout the plants' production processes by 1983. See infra notes 72-80, 96, and
accompanying text.
22. 430 U.S. at 128.
23. Id.
24. Clean Water Act, § 301(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982). This section states: "The
Administrator may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any specific
pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 1317(a)(1) of this title." Id.
25. Brief for Respondent NRDC at 20, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985) [hereinafter cited as NRDC Brief].
26. Brief for Environmental Protection Agency at 24, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985) [hereinafter cited as EPA Brief].
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hibit modifying "best available technology economically achievable" (BAT)
under sections 301(c)
2 7 and (g)2 8 of the CWA.
2 9
Two United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have interpreted section
301(l) in relation to FDF variances, and have differed in their conclusions.
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train3' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, addressing only "best practicable technology" (BPT)
3 1
FDF variances, held that the EPA Administrator was not precluded from
modifying requirements as they apply to substances on the toxic pollutants
list.3 2 Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in National Association of Metal Finishers v. Environmental Protection
27. Section 301(c) of the Clean Water Act states:
The Administrator may modify the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this sec-
tion with respect to any point source for which a permit application is filed after July
1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source satisfactory to
the Administrator that such modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum
use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2)
will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants.
Clean Air Act, § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982).
28. Section 301(g) of the Clean Water Act provides in part:
The Administrator, with the concurrence of the State, shall modify the requirements
of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to the discharge of any pollutant
(other than pollutants identified pursuant to section 1314(a)(4) of this title, toxic
pollutants subject to section 1317(a) of this title, and the thermal component of dis-
charges) from any point source upon a showing by the owner or operator of such
point source satisfactory to the Administrator that - (A) such modified require-
ments will result at a minimum in compliance with the requirements of subsection
(b)(l)(A) or (C) of this section, whichever is applicable; (B) such modified require-
ments will not result in any additional requirements on any other point or nonpoint
source; and (C) such modification will interfere with the attainment or maintenance
of that water quality which shall assure protection of public water supplies, and the
protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife,
and allow recreational activities, in and on the water and such modification will not
result in the discharge of pollutants in quantities which may reasonably be antici-
pated to pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment because of
bioaccumulation, persistency in the environment, acute toxicity, chronic toxicity (in-
cluding carcinogenicity, mutagenicity or teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities.
Clean Water Act, § 301(g), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(g)(1) (1982).
29. Congress realized that some dischargers may have difficulty in meeting the costs of
installing new pollution control devices, so in 1972 they enacted § 301(c), enabling certain
dischargers to operate under less strict effluent limitations, so long as progress was still being
made towards eliminating the discharge of pollutants. Clean Water Act, § 301(c), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(c) (1982). Similarly, in 1977 Congress enacted § 301(g) to take into consideration
those point sources whose discharge has no effect or an insubstantial effect on the water quality
of the receiving body of water. Id. § 301(g), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(g) (1982). See supra notes 27-
28.
30. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
31. See supra note 21.
32. 620 F.2d at 1048.
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Agency33 concluded that the EPA Administrator does not have the authority
to issue FDF variances for any toxic pollutants.34 Both courts based their
reasoning on interpretations of the statutory language and legislative history
of section 301(l) and other sections of the CWA.3 5 In compliance with the
Third Circuit decision, the EPA withdrew the FDF variance procedure from
the pretreatment regulations involving toxic pollutants.36
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit's decision in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.37 The Court held that Congress did not
intend absolutely to prohibit the EPA from granting FDF variances for toxic
pollutants.38 Rather, the Court accepted the EPA's interpretation that Con-
gress intended only to forbid modification through the variance provisions,
sections 301(c) and (g), that were already included in the section with re-
spect to toxic materials.39 Writing for the majority, Justice White main-
tained that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history evinced
an unambiguous congressional intent to forbid toxic pollutant FDF vari-
ances.4 Moreover, the Court was not convinced that FDF variances were
inconsistent with the CWA's goals and operations.4 '
Writing for the dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and O'Connor, asserted that the majority's interpretation was "in-
consistent with the clear intent of Congress, as evidenced by the statutory
language, legislative history, and purpose" of the CWA.42 Justice Marshall
asserted that the words "modification" and "variance" were synonymous
according to both the legislative history of section 301(l) and past congres-
sional prohibitions against exceptions to rules.4 3 The dissent maintained
that congressional silence on FDF variances in the 1977 amendments was
not indicative of any intent to permit variances because Congress was not
aware of the Supreme Court's approval of variances in du Pont prior to the
amendments. 4" Justice Marshall also emphasized Congress' specific intent
to strengthen the regulation of toxic pollutants as found throughout the 1977
33. 719 F.2d 624 (3rd Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 646.
35. Id. at 643-46; see also Appalachian, 620 F.2d at 1046-48.
36. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(b)(2) (1984).
37. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
38. Id. at 1112.
39. Id. at 1108-10.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1110-12.
42. Id. at 1113.
43. Id. at 1114-15, 1127.
44. Id. at 1118-19.
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amendments' legislative history.4 5
This Note will trace the evolution of federal involvement in water pollu-
tion control starting with the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act of 1948 through the EPA's implementation of the latest
amendments to the Act. The Note will focus on the ambiguities existing
throughout the Clean Water Act and its attendant legislative history. In
particular, the discussion will highlight the difficulties encountered by the
EPA in implementing the CWA effluent limitation provisions according to
congressional intent. It will also examine the EPA's "Fundamentally Differ-
ent Factor" (FDF) variance for dischargers from industry-wide regulations
and the criticisms with which this variance has been met. Further, this Note
will provide an overview of lower court decisions that addressed the CWA
and effluent limitation issuance, specifically those cases that lead to E.L du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train. It will also analyze the most recent
Supreme Court pronouncement construing the Clean Water Act. An exami-
nation of Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. will show that the Court correctly deferred to the EPA's statu-
tory interpretation that allowed FDF variances. The Note will conclude
with an overview of Congress' reaction to the Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation decision.
I. LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT OF 1948
A. Federal Involvement in Water Pollution Control 1948-1972
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in
1948 as a five-year experiment. 46 This, however, was not the federal govern-
ment's first involvement in water pollution control.47 The purposes of this
legislation included federal support to the states for technical research and
45. Id. at 1115.
46. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
47. The Federal government's first attempt to curtail water pollution occurred in response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
The Court held that there was no common law rule regulating obstructions to navigation. Id.
at 8. Congress subsequently passed section 13 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899, also
known as the Refuse Act, prohibiting discharge of "refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers ... into any navigable water of the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
... into such navigable water." Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)). For a more in-depth analysis, see Comment, The Refuse
Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1444 (1970).
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limited loans for the construction of treatment plants.48 Enforcement pow-
ers in water pollution control were delegated to state governors.49 Federal
authorities could only sue interstate violators for abatement of a public nui-
sance, an ineffective, time-consuming administrative procedure.50
Realizing the drawbacks in constraining federal involvement in water pol-
lution control, as well as the ineffectiveness of local enforcement of state
regulations, 5 ' Congress revised the FWPCA five times between 1948 and
1972.52 In 1956, Congress established the FWPCA as permanent legislation,
created a federal-state cooperative policy to control pollution,5 3 and in-
creased federal grants for the construction of local waste treatment works
and expansions of state water pollution control projects. 54 The amendments
of 1961 modified federal enforcement authority to encompass navigable, in-
terstate, and intrastate waters.
55
With the enactment of the Water Quality Act of 1965, the principal water
48. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
49. Id.
50. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV.
1103, 1104-07 (1970). One commentator has stated:
The early version of the Act provided for an enforcement conference which could
only be convened at the request of the affected state. The federal enforcement power
was diluted because of a prodigious amount of bureaucratic procedure which in-
cluded a hearing in the location of the disputed discharge, a recommendation to the
appropriate federal administrator, followed by attempted judicial enforcement if the
affected state or states so agreed.
Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977:" Great Expectations Unrealized, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 259,
260 n.9.
51. The FWPCA and its subsequent amendments until 1972 failed to protect the waters
because of "the failure of the individual states to exercise their own water pollution control
authority . . . the absence of uniform national standards to provide a minimum level of pro-
tection" and "the use of water quality standards as a regulatory device proving ineffective."
Parenteau & Tauman, The Effluent Limitations Controversy: Will Careless Draftsmanship Foil
the Objectives of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972?, 6 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 9 (1976).
52. See Note, supra note 50, at 260.
53. Positive commentary was made about the 1956 amendments: "Though the 1956 legis-
lation added little in the way of substantive protection, it did recognize as a matter of policy
that a broader national effort, with better federal-state cooperation, was needed to combat the
increasing pressures of population and economic growth upon the nation's natural resources."
Parenteau & Tauman, supra note 51, at 9 (footnotes omitted).
54. Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498
(1956) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
55. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88,
75 Stat. 204 (1961) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
There is specific authorization for state governors to bring civil actions against the Administra-
tion for failure to enforce effluent standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1982).
1986]
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pollution control mechanism became state water quality standards (WQS). 56
States were responsible for the formulation of water quality criteria and im-
plementation plans, designation of uses for bodies of water 57 and enforce-
ment of pollution standards.5" Although only the states could create
implementation plans, the newly established Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Administration had the authority to set water quality standards if a state
refused or did not set adequate standards.5 9 However, the procedure for
setting quality standards was cumbersome, many states were encountering
difficulties in establishing relationships between pollutants and water us-
age,6 1 and the awkward division of enforcement authority62 stunted any pro-
gress in preventing continued deterioration of the waters. Despite additional
legislative efforts in 196663 and 1970,6' these defects in the Water Quality
56. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
57. Id. § 5(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (1965) (eliminated 1972). The Water Quality Act did
not actually list the designation of uses for bodies of water as part of the states' responsibilities.
58. Id. According to one commentator,
[a] designated use (such as recreation or fishing) describes how a state wants to use a
water segment. Water-quality criteria ensure that the water is clean enough to sup-
port the designated use. Typical criteria include specific requirements for dissolved
oxygen (which fish breathe), specific limits on fecal-coliform bacteria (sewage bacte-
ria), and general restrictions on unpleasant sights, smells, and tastes. Implementa-
tion plans describe how the pollution-control agencies intend to bring waters into
compliance with the WQS [Water Quality Standards].
Comment, Water-Quality Standards, Maximum Loads, and the Clean Water Act: The Need
for Judicial Enforcement, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
59. Water Quality Act, § 5(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (1965) (eliminated 1972).
60. The enforcement procedure created in the FWPCA of 1948 remained the same
throughout these amendments. Parenteau & Tauman, supra note 51, at 10; see also Hall, The
Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611 (1978); see generally Parenteau & Tauman, supra note 51.
61. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
at 704, 1254 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
62. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
63. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966) (codi-
fied as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)).
64. The federal government made two additional efforts to correct the deficiencies in the
water pollution control program. Congress passed The Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. I 1983)), in order to expand federal involvement in water pollution control.
The Act provided for regulation of oil and hazardous substances for the first time. Id. at
§ Il(a)-(p) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)-(r) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). In addi-
tion, the Act made federal activities that were potentially detrimental to water quality subject
to state enforcement authority. Id. at § 21(a)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (1970) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
Prior to 1970, dischargers were not required to obtain permits that would monitor and limit
[Vol. 35:595
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Act were not fully remedied. An increase in social, political, and environ-
mental awareness stemming from activist movements in the 1960's moti-
vated Congress to restructure drastically the entire water pollution control
program.
65
B. The 1972 Amendments: "End of the Pipe" Regulations
Congress took a major step in centralizing water pollution control man-
agement through enactment of the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA, re-
ferred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA).66 The EPA was charged with
carrying out the primary goals of the CWA in three stages: determination of
point source discharge effluent limitations by 1977;67 installation of pollution
control devices by 1983;68 and total elimination of pollutant discharges by
1985.69
The initial step in pollution control to be completed by 1977 was directed
toward treatment at the point of discharge or point source. The inefficient
prior method of monitoring water quality standards7° was replaced by "end
of the pipe" effluent limitations. 71 After a period of research and testing, the
the amount of waste discharged into navigable waters. President Nixon addressed this void in
the regulatory scheme by creating a federal permit program, Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R.
188 (1970), reprinted in 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), under § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899. The program, however, that was to be under the authority of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers, did not withstand district court scrutiny. See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1971) (holding that the program did not require applicants to submit environmental impact
statements prior to issuance of permits). Congress salvaged this enforcement mechanism when
it established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) in the 1972
Amendments. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
65. See generally W. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
(1973).
66. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)). Discussion of the 1972 amendments will be limited to
sections relevant to the topic in this Note. For a broader treatment of the 1972 amendments,
see Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 459
(1973); Comment, Deficiencies in the Regulatory Scheme of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trolAct Amendments of1972, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 208 (1974); Comment, Federal Water Pollu-
tion Laws: A Critical Lack of Enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 945 (1983); Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 893.
67. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
70. Administrative agencies responsible for monitoring water quality standards encoun-
tered immense difficulties in pinpointing violators from a group located proximately to one
another. In addition, the agencies found it difficult to calculate the amount of waste water
which could be discharged while maintaining the proper water quality standard. Parenteau &
Tauman, supra note 51, at 12; Comment, supra note 58, at 1253-55.
71. Clean Water Act, § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982). This section states:
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EPA was to define guidelines72 for technology-based effluent limits for each
category of point sources.73 Existing74 nonmunicipal point sources were to
achieve the "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT)
in end of the process technology by 1977." 5 Publicly owned treatment works
were to achieve secondary treatment by that date as well.
76
For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this chapter the
Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal and State agencies
and other interested persons, publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regula-
tions, providing guidelines for effluent limitation, and, at least annually thereafter,
revise, if appropriate, such regulations.
Id.
However, water quality standards were kept in the Act as a supplement to effluent limita-
tions. Clean Water Act, § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982).
72. However, Congress was unclear as to who was responsible for setting and enforcing
the effluent limitations:
As is invariably the case with legislative standards, these are vague, general, and in
need of administrative, even litigative, clarification. Unfortunately, Congress was
less clear than it could have been in designating the administrative official responsible
for giving content to the 1977 and 1983 standards by means of effluent limitations.
Rather than expressly directing the Administrator, the logical choice to perform this
task, [§ 301(b)] merely states that the prescribed effluent limitations "shall be
achieved."
Parenteau & Tauman, supra note 51, at 16. See also infra notes 151-80 and accompanying
text.
73. The EPA was directed by Congress to set national effluent limitations, uniform cate-
gories and subcategories of dischargers based on the availability and cost of pollution removal
technology, along with other factors specified in § 304 of the CWA. Clean Water Act, § 301,
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
74. Existing sources are those which were already built when the EPA proposed or
promulgated the effluent limitation or pretreatment standards. Telephone interview with Gary
Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Technical Support Branch of the EPA Office of Water (July 26,
1985). New sources are those which have been constructed since the EPA issued standards of
performance under § 306 of the CWA applicable to such sources. Id. Consequently, the new
source performance standards are more strict and are not eligible for modification through
§§ 301(c), 301(g), or FDF variances. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
75. Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(A) (1982). The EPA de-
fined BPT as "the average of the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages and
unit processes within each industrial category or subcategory." 40 C.F.R. § 125 (1985).
Rather than looking at a broad range of plants, the EPA based the average on the performance
levels of exemplary plants. Id. The term "practicable" refers to "the consideration of total
internal and external costs of applying the technology weighed against the effluent reduction
benefits derived from applying the technology." Note, supra note 50, at 261 n.21.
Representative Jones defined total cost as "those internal, or plant costs sustained by owner
or operator and those external costs such as potential unemployment, dislocation, and rural
area economic development sustained by the community, area, or region." 1972 Legislative
History, supra note 61, at 231.
76. Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1982). Publicly owned
treatment works refer to those under the control of municipalities. A "municipality," as de-
fined in the CWA, is "a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, association, or other
public body created by or pursuant to State law and having jurisdiction over disposal of sew-
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During the 1983 stage, in order to achieve the "fishable-swimmable""
goal, dischargers were to have begun installing pollution control devices to
treat pollutants throughout the entire manufacturing process of a plant.7"
For existing nonmunicipal point sources, the "best available technology eco-
nomically achievable" (BAT) standard was to be in use by 1983.79 Publicly
owned treatment works also had to have the "best practicable waste treat-
ment technology" (BPWTT) standard in place by that date.8 °
In order to enforce these deadlines, Congress created the National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).8' Under this system, dis-
chargers who discharged pollutants into the navigable waters without having
first obtained an NPDES permit would violate the law. Thereafter, the dis-
charger was under a legal obligation to meet with effluent limitation require-
ments by the specified dates.8 2 The EPA was also given authority to issue
age, industrial wastes, or other wastes .. " Clean Water Act, § 502(4), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (1982). Many municipalities have "treatment works" for "preventing, abating, re-
ducing, storing, treating, separating, or disposing of municipal waste, including storm water
runoff, or industrial waste .. " Clean Water Act, § 212(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1292(2)(B)
(1982). See infra note 84 and accompanying text. Nonmunicipal sources include any others
who discharge directly into navigable waters.
77. Clean Water Act, § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). This goal provides that
"it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recrea-
tion in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983. Id.
78. Note, supra note 50, at 261.
79. Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982). The main differ-
ence between the factors considered in setting BPT and BAT effluent limitation is in the use of
a cost/benefit analysis, which is emphasized in the former, but not in the latter. See generally
Baum, Legislating Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Experience,
9 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 75 (1983).
In lieu of performing a cost/benefit analysis to establish BAT limitations, the EPA is re-
quired to consider "the cost of achieving such effluent reduction." Therefore, BAT permits
less flexibility than BPT. According to the BAT standard, "best" means the best performer in
the industrial category; "available" means demonstrative technological and economic viability;
"technology" means the entire plant process. Note, supra note 50, at 261 n.21. See also supra
notes 21, 75, and accompanying text.
80. Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
81. Id. §§ 301(a), 402(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1982). To date, 36 states and I
territory (the Virgin Islands), have EPA-approved NPDES programs for issuance of permits
for direct dischargers. Only 22 states presently have been authorized to run the pretreatment
programs. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,089 (Oct. 17, 1985). Under this program the localities can impose
restrictions on indirect dischargers in whatever manner they prefer. Rather than issuing spe-
cific permits, the localities may, for example, choose to make a contract with the discharger or
issue a general ordinance. Telephone interview with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Techni-
cal Support Branch of the EPA Office of Water (July 25, 1985). See generally Davis & Glas-
ser, The Discharge Permit Program Under The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972-
Improvement of Water Quality Through the Regulation of Dischargers From, Industrial Facili-
ties, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 179 (1974).
82. Clean Water Act, §§ 301(a), 402(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1982).
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permits, to establish state permit programs, and to veto permits when
necessary. 3
In addition to these first two stages, Congress initiated supplemental steps
to reach the necessary goals. For those indirectly discharging into publicly
owned treatment works (POTWs), Congress requested the development of
pretreatment standards.8 4 Moreover, it designated eighteen billion dollars
for the construction of POTWs across the country.8 5 Further, with the in-
tent of making elimination of toxic pollutants a high priority, 6 Congress
instructed the EPA to publish a list of toxic pollutants for which special
effluent limitations would have to be established. 7
Anticipating success in these programs and regulations, Congress set the
1985 goal to be one of "zero discharge."8 8 Although it was not immediately
feasible, proponents of this goal believed that, through the BPT and BAT
deadlines, industries would rapidly develop technological advances in pollu-
tion control.8 9 Although new sources would be able to incorporate these
advanced pollution control devices, existing plants found this task more
83. Id. § 402(b)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(d) (1982).
84. Id. § 307(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1) (1982). This section provides that:
[t]he Administrator shall, within one hundred and eighty days after October 18,
1972, and from time to time thereafter, publish proposed regulations establishing
pretreatment standards for introduction of pollutants into treatment works (as de-
fined in section 1292 of this title) which are publicly owned for those pollutants
which are determined not to be susceptible to treatment by such treatment works or
which would interfere with the operation of such treatment works. Not later than
ninety days after such publication, and after opportunity for public hearing, the Ad-
ministrator shall promulgate such pretreatment standards.
Id.
85. Id. §§ 106, 207, 208(0, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1287, 1288(f) (1982). POTWs, or munici-
pal sewer systems, are designed to treat simultaneously the combined waste of the municipal-
ity, both domestics and indirect, to the point where the end product may be discharged into
navigable waters in compliance with appropriate standards as well as without any effect on
water quality. Indirect dischargers must generally treat their waste water in accordance with
federal, state and local regulations before discharging into the POTW. Id.
86. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 61, at 764. Congress clearly stated its intent
by declaring that "it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited." Clean Water Act, § 101(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1982).
87. Clean Water Act, § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1982). Prior to the 1977
amendments, § 307(a)(1) did not explicitly relate how the EPA was to establish effluent stan-
dards for toxic pollutants. See supra notes 100-08.
88. Id. § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). This section declares that "it is the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."
Id. For further discussion of "zero discharge" see generally Comment, supra note 58.
89. See 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 61, at 703-05. See also Note, Technol-
ogy-Forcing and Federal-Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 777, 805 (1977).
But see 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 61, at 1116-17, 1186-89; W. RODGERS,




At the time the 1972 amendments were enacted, conflicts that might arise
due to the complexity of the provisions "were only dimly perceived."'" Con-
gress established the National Commission on Water Quality (the Commis-
sion) to report on any needed corrections based on observations of the first
few years of the CWA's implementation.92 After evaluating the conclusions
of the Commission,93 as well as testimony from the EPA, federal, state
and local administrators, environmental groups, and industries, Congress
deemed it necessary to enact further amendments to the CWA in 1977.
C. The Clean Water Act of 1977: Fine Tuning the 1972 Amendments
1. Toxic Pollutants and the NRDC Consent Decree
The main thrust of the 1977 amendments focused on the elimination of
toxic pollutants.94 However, in the process of "fine tuning"95 the 1972
amendments, Congress also created provisions for extension of deadlines,96
change in the levels of treatment,97 and development of more options for
modification of standards. 98
90. See 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 61, at 413-15, 705, 1116, 1262-63. Oppo-
nents also contended that elimination of all point sources would not be sufficient because of
pollution attributed to nonpoint sources. Id. at 354, 430; see also supra note 9.
91. Hall, The Clean WaterAct of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCES L. 343, 344 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hall, Clean Water Act].
92. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
93. See Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 344-45.
94. See 123 CONG. REC. 38,959 (1977) (statement of Rep. Roberts). See infra notes 109-
11 and accompanying text.
95. Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 345. For additional discussion of the 1977
amendments, see Note, Recent Developments. Highlights of the Clean Water Act of 1977 8
ENVTL. L. 869 (1978).
96. Deadlines were extended by § 309(a)(5)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5) (1982) (1977 BPT
deadlines on a case-by-case basis for industrial dischargers); § 301(i)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(i)(l)
(1982) (1977 secondary treatment deadlines for municipal waste treatment facilities);
§ 301(b)(2)(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(c) (1982) (BAT deadlines of industrial dischargers ex-
tended until July 1, 1984 for toxic pollutants); § 301(k), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(k) (1982) (deadline
for dischargers using a new and innovative process or technology extended until no later than
July 1, 1987).
97. New levels of treatment were created by Congress for conventional and nonconven-
tional pollutants. By July 1, 1984 industrial dischargers were to attain the "best conventional
pollutant control technology" (BCT). Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.
§ 131 l(b)(3)(E) (1982). Nonconventional pollutants were to meet effluent limitations based on
BAT no later than July 1, 1987. Id. § 301(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(3)(F) (1982). For a
detailed explanation of conventional and nonconventional pollutants see Note, supra note 95,
at 874-78.
98. Congress added a new option for modification of the secondary treatment requirement
for POTW discharges into deep marine waters and for modification from BAT effluent limita-
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In implementing section 307(a) of the 1972 amendments,9 9 the EPA en-
countered more obstacles than Congress had foreseen."° The EPA lacked
adequate resources and manpower to make a list of toxic pollutants within
the time constraints set by Congress.' ' The original list of nine toxic pollu-
tants promulgated by the EPA 1 2 met with opposition from both industries
and environmental groups."0 3 The Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) filed suit in federal court to expand the list of toxic pollutants and
to create a strict schedule by which the EPA would be required to promul-
gate CWA regulations." 4 This litigation ended with the signing of a settle-
ment agreement based upon a new strategy proposed by the EPA for toxic
pollutants.0 5 The main elements of the NRDC consent decree pertained to
the commitment made by the EPA to investigate and promulgate effluent
limitations and pretreatment standards for sixty-five toxic pollutants dis-
charged by the twenty-one industrial categories10 6 on a fixed, court-ap-
tions for nonconventional pollutants based on water quality. Clean Water Act, §§ 301(g)-
301(h), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(g)-131 1(h) (1982). See supra note 28.
99. Clean Water Act, § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1982). In the 1972 amend-
ments Congress plainly directed the EPA to make a list of toxic pollutants. The 1977 amend-
ments provide for revisions to the list, and established criteria that the Administrator was
required to consider. In adding or removing a pollutant from the list the Administrator should
take into account the toxicity of the pollutants, its persistence, degradability, the usual or
potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the importance of the affected orga-
nisms, and the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollution on such organisms. Id.
100. Congress did not anticipate the magnitude and complexity involved in implementing
this section. Problems arose due to the volume of information needed to identify toxics, the
unrealistic time frames set by Congress, the lack of explicit authority to consider criteria such
as economic or technological feasibility, and the disruptive pollutant-by-pollutant regulatory
approach. See Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 352. See generally Hall, The Evolution
and Implementation of EPA's Regulatory Program To Control the Discharge of Toxic Pollu-
tants to the Nation's Waters, 10 NAT. RESOURCES L. 507, 513-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Hall, Evolution and Implementation].
101. Hall, Evolution and Implementation, supra note 100, at 513-14.
102. The list consisted of mercury, cadmium, benzidine, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
and four pesticides (aldrin-dieldrin, DDT, endrin, and toxaphene). 38 Fed. Reg. 24,344
(1973). Final effluent standards for these toxics were proposed by the EPA in December 1973.
40 C.F.R. § 129.4 (1985).
103. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified sub nom.
NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979), modified sub nom. NRDC v.
Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084 (D.D.C. 1982). The NRDC petitioned for more
toxics to be included on the list and industries argued that the proposed standards as they
currently existed were too strict and costly. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
2120-21.
104. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2120-21.
105. Id. For extensive analysis of the NRDC consent decree, see generally Hall, supra note
60; see also generally Hall, Evolution and Implementation, supra note 100.
106. Rather than setting national effluent standards for each pollutant, the EPA was di-
rected to establish standards on an industry-by-industry basis. NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep.




Essentially, Congress based its 1977 revisions to the toxic pollutant CWA
provisions on the new toxic strategy that was the result of the NRDC con-
sent decree. '0 8 This and other litigation served to magnify the need for Con-
gress to define more clearly its intentions concerning "the increasingly
evident toxic hazard."1 °9 The destruction attributed to toxic pollution,
brought to the attention of legislators, further amplified the consequences of
unmonitored toxic waste disposal."'
2. Section 301(1): Ambiguity in the Translation
While Congress may have explicitly communicated its concern about
toxic waste, a vague legislative history and conflicting language clouded the
precise meaning of certain accompanying provisions in the 1977 amend-
ments.'' In particular, the scope of the word "modify" as used in section
301(l) has been construed both broadly and narrowly. On one side, environ-
tries' attempts to install the proper technology if new toxics were added to the list at a later
date. See Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 353.
107. See NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2125, 2128.
108. See Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 353-58, for a discussion of Congress'
adoption of the EPA's strategy. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Costle, 636
F.2d 1229, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
109. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 95TH CONG. 2D SESS., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 at 326 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Roberts) [hereinafter cited as 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
110. For example, Senator Muskie, commented:
The seriousness of the toxics problem is just beginning to be understood. New cases
are reported each day of unacceptable concentrations of materials in the aquatic envi-
ronment, in fish and shellfish, and even in mother's milk. Empirical evidence has
shown a statistical correlation between material in New Orleans' drinking water and
cancer mortality rates; Kepone has destroyed the James River, one of America's
most productive, and most historic rivers; PCBs are pervasive and have ruined the
fishing in the Hudson River and the Great Lakes; carbon tetracholoride is only the
most recent material to contaminate the Ohio River; the pesticide enfrin has been
found in Mississippi; perhaps the worst of all, are the ones we do not know yet. The
more we find out, the more cause there is for concern. It is imperative that these
materials be controlled.
Id. at 454. Speaking in terms of the everyday effects of toxic pollutants, Representative Rob-
erts commented: "[T]oxics have not only polluted drinking water and destroyed both com-
mercial and sport fishing, but in many major water bodies they also constitute a hazard to
aquatic environment and public health that has yet to be fully recognized." Id. at 327. See
also id. at 334 (memorandum). Senator Culver expressed the sense of urgency to reduce toxic
pollution apparent throughout the 1977 amendments when he asserted: "There is no room for
compromise here; toxics must be controlled." Id. at 549.
11I. As one commentator projected:
The 1977 amendments have eased a number of burdens, and clarified many of the
uncertainties of the prior legislation. . . . It would be unrealistic to expect that
these amendments, given their multifaceted nature and far-reaching impact will not
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mentalists have asserted that "modify" was meant to encompass all forms of
modification, including those in section 301.112 On the other side, industries
and the EPA, taking a more narrow interpretation, have contended that
"modify" only refers to the specific congressionally created provisions in sec-
tion 301, namely sections 301(c) and (g)." 13
Both of these positions find some support in the legislative history." 4 In
general, members of Congress advocated implementing "new regulations
more restrictive than any previously contemplated" for toxic pollutants."
15
However, Congress failed to take an unequivocal stand in phrasing section
301(l), a provision that was intended to be a major step against toxic pollu-
tion. No language in the provision precisely delineated the intended mean-
ing of the term "modify".
Moreover, the 1977 legislative history of section 301(l) did not narrow the
definitional limits of the word "modify" to one plainly intended meaning.
Although legislators equated "modification" with a "waiver" during de-
bates, " 6 oftentimes these terms were referred to during discussions involv-
ing the modification procedures governed by sections 301(c) and (g), but not
the prohibition in section 301(l).117
Section 301(l) furthermore lacks substantial legislative history because
the provision was not formulated until the conference committee stage of the
legislative process.' The Senate bill contained an amendment to section
301(c) prohibiting waivers for toxic pollutants based solely on economic af-
fordability." 9 In addition, the Senate bill contained section 301(g) which
raise new problems of statutory interpretation even as they lay to rest some of the old
ones.
Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 372.
112. NRDC Brief at 20, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
113. EPA Brief at 24, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
114. The Fourth Circuit remarked: "The two-volume, 1776 page, Legislative History is of
little help. In it, statements can be found to uphold almost any position which one cares to
take." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1027 (4th Cir. 1976).
115. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 411 (statement of Rep. Buchanan).
Representative Buchanan also remarked that pretreatment standards should preclude toxics
"to the maximum extent feasible," from ever entering municipal sewage plants. Id. at 690.
Unqualified use of the word "feasible" is another example of the ambiguity found in much of
the legislative history surrounding § 301(1).
116. See id. at 306, 677 (statement of Rep. Roberts).
117. Id. at 458, 461 (statement of Sen. Muskie); id. at 331 (statement of Rep. Roberts); id.
at 673-77. Additionally, the EPA used the term "variance" to refer to both §§ 301(c) and
301(h) modification provisions. Id. at 1419, 1438 (statement of Mr. Jorling).
118. Id. at 582-83.
119. See id. at 584, 677. As with § 301(l), § 301(c) had very little direct discussion re-
corded in the 1972 legislative history because it was created in the Conference Committee. See
Kalur, Will Judicial Error Allow Industrial Point Sources To Avoid BPT and Perhaps BAT
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allows for new modifications from BAT standards based on water quality,
except for toxics. 12° A similar provision, however, was not incorporated
into the House bill.
12 1
Although neither of the bills contained section 301(l), the prohibitions in
both sections 301(c) and (g) were conceptually very similar to that section.
In the final draft, the committee deleted the waiver provision from section
301(c), redrafted section 301(g) to prohibit waivers for conventional, ther-
mal, and toxic pollutants, and added section 301(l).122 A comment made
during House of Representatives debates reiterated the idea embodied in sec-
tion 301(l) that toxic pollutants would not be subject to waivers or modifica-
tion. 123 Significantly, the same statement made reference only to prohibition
of the modifications allowed in sections 301(c) and (g).124 Thus, based on
the unclear statutory language and lack of legislative history for section
301(l), as the EPA undertook its task of promulgating effluent limitations
and pretreatment standards after 1977, restrictions against modification
seemed limited to sections 301(c) and (g).
D. Implementation of the Clean Water Act by the Environmental
Protection Agency
1. The Rulemaking Procedure
Given the magnitude of the task assigned to the EPA, the promulgation of
Later? A Story of Good Intentions, Bad Dictum, and Ugly Consequence, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 955,
980 n.152 (1979).
120. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 582-83. In creating § 301(g), Con-
gress intended to give the EPA some flexibility in implementing BAT industry standards. Id.
at 674.
121. Id. at 1167.
122. It is not clear why the Conference Committee took out the prohibition of modification
from § 301(c), kept it in § 301(g), and then created § 301(l). The Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n sug-
gested that the prohibition of modification was left in § 30 1(g) for the sake of completeness in
the list of pollutants excluded from the provision. Brief of Petitioner Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n at
30 n.38, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 1102
(1985) [hereinafter cited as CMA Briefl.
123. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 328-29.
Due to the nature of toxic pollutants, those identified for regulation will not be sub-
ject to waivers from or modification of the requirements prescribed under this sec-
tion, specifically, neither section 301(c) waivers based on the economic capability of the
discharger nor 301(g) waivers based on water quality considerations shall be available.
Id. (emphasis added).
In early commentaries made about the 1977 amendments, section 301(1 ) was interpreted to
refer only to the modifications in sections 301(c) and 30 1(g). See Kalur, supra note 119, at 984
n.172; Hall, Clean Water Act, supra note 91, at 359. It is interesting to note that one of the
commentators had discussed FDF variances throughout his article, and yet still did not men-
tion them in relation to § 301(1). See generally Kalur, supra note 119.
124. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 328-29.
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national standards for effluent limitations proceeded at a slow pace. 125 In
order to accelerate the issuance of final regulations, the EPA focused on a
few typical plants in each category of dischargers. 126 Congress furnished the
EPA with a list of factors to be considered in establishing each set of
standards. 1
27
Although Congress explicitly stated those elements that the EPA should
consider in developing the effluent limitation standards, t1 2 the procedure for
application of these guidelines was indefinite. The legislative history indi-
cates that Congress was uncertain as to the amount of flexibility permitted
during the rulemaking procedure.1 29 Some members of Congress advocated
that the standards be "as uniform as possible," and that "similar point
sources with similar characteristics" be treated the same.' 3 The EPA
adopted this philosophy in formulating the standards by allowing for some
subcategorization when a plant or group of plants was not "similar" to
others within the category. 131 However, additional comments during the
125. See generally Kalur, supra note 119, at 957. For a detailed description of rulemaking
procedure, see EPA Brief at 4-6, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
126. The EPA must set and revise standards for both direct and indirect dischargers. Due
to the stringent deadlines by which the EPA had to promulgate these standards, the EPA
examined the most representative plants in each category. See EPA Brief at 5 n.3, Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n.
127. Congress directed the EPA in setting BPT guidelines to consider:
[T]he total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction bene-
fits to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of
the application of various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water
quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factor
as the Administrator deems appropriate ....
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1982).
Factors considered in setting BAT guidelines include "the age of equipment and facilities
involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of
control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water
quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate." Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B). However, Congress did not state
whether local state authorities or the EPA would issue the final effluent limitation for each
discharger. See supra note 72.
128. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
130. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 309. Although this concept seemed
to "reflect a compromise between the-absolute uniformity and absolute individuality positions
advocated in the debates," when the EPA began to establish guidelines "implementation of the
'as uniform as possible' standard involve[d] practical problems." Parenteau & Tauman, supra
note 51, at 15.
131. The EPA attempted to take into account the diversity within each category by creat-
ing subcategories. However, industries still found the effluent limitations in the subcategories
to be too stringent and not individualized enough. See McKinnon, The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act-Industrial Challenges to Effluent Limitations, 7 ENVTL. AFF. 545, 562-63
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debates suggested that Congress did not intend standards to be set on an
individual, plant-by-plant basis.' 32
Further, Congress did not provide the EPA with any direction in deter-
mining the guidelines for pretreatment standards. The EPA adopted the
technology-based criteria designated for direct dischargers as the basis for
setting standards for indirect dischargers.' 33 Delays in promulgation of
these guidelines, however, led to the litigation that generated the NRDC
consent decree which included a court-ordered schedule and approval of
technology-based pretreatment standards.' 3 4 In the 1977 amendments, Con-
gress endorsed the EPA's use of direct discharger criteria in setting pretreat-
ment standards.' Final regulations were issued for indirect dischargers in
1978.136
2. FDF Variances As Safety Valves: The EPA's Interpretation of
Congressional Directive and Resulting Criticism
Congress' failure to specify clearly the extent to which the EPA was re-
quired to consider differences among dischargers within a subcategory gave
the EPA great latitude in promulgating effluent limitation guidelines and
(1979). Although industries have challenged subcategories, the NRDC and other environmen-
tal groups have accepted this part of the rulemaking procedure. At oral argument, the NRDC
asserted:
We have never contended either in the consent decree or in the context of specific
effluent guidelines that EPA does not have considerable discretion in the creation of
subcategories. EPA, for example, is considering a subcategory for only one dis-
charger in the context of the ore mining category. And similarly the agency has
created a category for only three inorganic chemical companies. These examples are
given only to demonstrate that we accept the fact that EPA will in the context of the
effluent guidelines themselves, in some cases have to address specific significant dif-
ferentiating factors between dischargers consistent with the criteria in section 304(b).
Transcript at 252, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985). Further, the NRDC stated
that the EPA would have flexibility in setting up pretreatment standards through subcat-
egorization. Id. at 247. But see Kalur, supra note 119, at 967 (criticism of subcategories).
132. During the debates, Senator Muskie commented: "The Conferees intend that the fac-
tors described in section 304(b) be considered only within classes or categories of point sources
and that such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation
to an individual point source within such a category or class." 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 61, at 172. Remarks such as this appear to conflict with subcategorization and the
"uniform as possible" directive, because no allowance is made for variation in the factors
among the point sources.
133. 40 C.F.R. pt. 403 (1985).
134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135. See 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 271; see also Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,736-73, 40 C.F.R. pt. 403 (1985). Revised pretreatment regulations
were promulgated in 1981. 40 C.F.R. § 403 (1981). Subsequent revisions have also been
made.
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standards. However, the enormous amount of discretion delegated to the
EPA also left the agency's regulations open to challenges from industries,
particularly because of improper subcategorization.13 7 Recognizing the in-
adequacy of subcategorizationt 3 8 and the effluent guidelines development
process in assuring procedural and substantive due process, the EPA created
the "Fundamentally Different Factor" (FDF) variance procedure. 139 The
FDF variance allows for differentiation among plants in the same category
or subcategory. Plants may vary in the types or quantities of pollutants, the
required methods of pollutant control, and the costs of complying with
promulgated effluent limitation." 4 By providing for the availability of this
type of variance, the EPA compensated for the possible oversight of an atyp-
ical plant within a subcategory. t4 l
Currently, fifty-eight requests for FDF variances have been submitted to
137. See McKinnon, supra note 131, at 560, 562-63. The EPA's actions have also been
challenged due to faults in the general rulemaking methodology, and the improper choice of
pollution control technology. Id. at 560-65. Examples of successful challenges include:
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.
1976); Tanners' Council of Am. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1976).
138. Between the volumes of information the EPA had to gather and the short amount of
time allowed under the NRDC decree, categories could not be broken down as much as possi-
ble. CMA Brief at 35 n.51, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
139. The FDF variance is an administrative mechanism to provide an opportunity for relief
from the application of national effluent limitation guidelines and standards for existing
sources if an individual's facilities are fundamentally different from the factors considered in
establishing the guideline or standard. Formal communication with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., At-
torney in Technical support Branch of the EPA Office of Water (Dec. 3, 1985). The EPA
found the authority to promulgate effluent limitations with FDF variance provisions in
§ 501(a) of the CWA, which states: "The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regu-
lations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter." Clean Water Act,
§ 501(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1982). Procedural regulations for direct discharger FDF vari-
ance requests are in 40 C.F.R. pt. 124 (1985), and substantive regulations are in 40 C.F.R. pt.
125, subpt. D (1985). Substantive and procedural regulations for indirect discharger FDF
variance requests are in 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1985).
140. EPA Brief at 14, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. The six statutory factors that may be funda-
mentally different include: "[tihe nature or quality of pollutants contained in the raw waste
load of the applicant's process wastewater," 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 l(d)(l) (1985); "[t]he volume of
the discharger's process wastewater and effluent discharged," 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(d)(2) (1985);
nonwater quality environmental impact, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(d)(3) (1985); energy require-
ments, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(d)(4); age, size, land availability, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(d)(5) (1985);
and cost of compliance, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(d)(6) (1985). Similar provisions for indirect dis-
chargers are contained at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(d) (1985).
141. Id. One commentator has stated:
EPA has an affirmative duty to develop effluent limitations that can withstand all
possible procedural, statutory and substantive challenges. EPA, being a government
agency, has as its primary function the duty to serve the public. . . . Industry is also
a part of the public, so that it too has a right to fair regulations.
McKinnon, supra note 131, at 565.
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EPA headquarters for action by direct dischargers, 142 and forty-nine re-
quests have been made by indirect dischargers.143 Of the direct discharger
requests, four have been approved,' 44 thirty-nine have been either denied,
withdrawn, or returned to the regional offices, and fifteen are still pend-
ing. 145 Few, if any, of the indirect discharger requests have been decided. 1
4 6
142. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Memorandum on Fundamentally Different
Factors Variance Status for Direct Dischargers from Martha G. Prothro, Director, Permits
Division (September 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum on FDF Variance Status],
updated by formal communication with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Technical Support
Branch of the EPA Office of Water (December 3, 1985).
143. Telephone interview with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Technical Support
Branch of the EPA Office of Water (July 26, 1985).
144. Memorandum on FDF Variance Status, supra note 142. The EPA approved the four
FDF variances based on the process and equipment of each facility being fundamentally differ-
ent than those of the typical plants observed during the rulemaking procedure. For instance,
the Birdsall Sand and Gravel Company, in the mineral, mining, and processing point source
category, construction sand and gravel subcategory, qualified for a variance because the eleva-
tion and distance of the plant from the point of discharge was unique in comparison to others
in the subcategory. Final Decision of the Administrator, FDF 77-18, Birdsall Sand and
Gravel Company, Washed Sand and Gravel Plant, Oral, South Dakota, NPDES Number SD
000183 (July 10, 1978). In meeting the recycling requirements of the effluent limitations, the
company would incur greater expense in piping and pumping than had been projected during
the development of the guidelines. Id.
145. Memorandum on FDF Variance Status, supra note 142. The EPA denied 15 variance
requests for six major reasons including: (1) limitations being withdrawn by the EPA (C.F.
Industries, May 25, 1977); (2) process employed by plant not fundamentally different from
others in same category (Allied Chemical, June 21, 1976; Martin Marietta (OR) and (WA),
Oct. 3, 1977; Van Camp Seafood, Oct. 19, 1978; Georgia-Pacific, Aug 21, 1980; Alaska Pulp,
Sept. 21, 1984; Louisiana-Pacific Corp., Sept. 21 1984); (3) applicable guidelines remanded or
withdrawn by court order (Kaiser Aluminum, Nov. 12, 1976); (4) request for variance already
resolved by the EPA in equitable manner and upheld by federal courts (Shell Oil, June 30,
1978); (5) factor in question not one to be considered (Crown Simpson Pulp, Sept. 15, 1977;
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., Sept. 15, 1977); and (6) facility shutdown with no plans for reopening
(Hecla Mining, April 8, 1983).
Reason for withdrawals include: (1) installation of necessary equipment during pendency of
request (City of Los Angeles-3 plants, June 11, 1985); (2) modified individual permit, not
industry-wide standards, allowed according to regulations (Aluminum Refining, June 8, 1981;
Textile Chemicals, July 27, 1977; City of Burbank, Sept. 9, 1977; Consolidated Edison, Nov. 6,
1978); (3) revisions in effluent limitation guideline regulations after FDF variance application
filed (Pacific G&E-Contra Costa, Nov. 10, 1983; (Pacific G & E-Potrero, June 21, 1984); (4)
regulations being remanded to the EPA by federal court (Dixie Sand and Gravel, Nov. 15,
1979); and (5) plants closing permanently (Kerr-McGee Chemical, Jan. 15, 1981).
146. Telephone interview with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Technical Support
Branch of the EPA Office of Water (July 26, 1985). The reason that few, if any, FDF variance
requests for indirect dischargers have been decided is that most of the regulations were only
issued in the last two years. In addition, the EPA repealed FDF variance provisions for toxic
pollutants for indirect dischargers in response to National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 719 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1983). Id. These provisions were reestab-
lished by the EPA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n on
September 25, 1985. Id.
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Despite the limited number of FDF variances granted by the EPA, environ-
mental groups, such as the NRDC, have strongly criticized the FDF proce-
dure and its potential negative consequences. The major criticisms include:
recognition of the economic inability of a plant to comply with the uniform
regulations as a factor in the FDF variance decision;147 the long length of
time for the issuance of a final decision and lack of a stay provision; 48 the
ineffectiveness of the option to request that effluent limitations be made
147. Although the EPA has not granted many variances, several opponents, including vari-
ous commentators and environmental groups, still find flaws in both the procedure and poten-
tial consequences of FDF variances. A major criticism involves the inclusion of the economic
inability of the plant to comply with the uniform effluent limitation as a factor in the FDF
decision. The NRDC asserts that economic ability should not be considered in granting vari-
ances. NRDC Brief at 34-35, Chemical Mfr& Ass'n. However, the EPA does not base its
decision on the overall financial weakness of a facility. EPA Brief at 15, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
Rather, the EPA determines whether the cost to the plant is wholly out of proportion to the
cost estimate based on typical plants during the rulemaking procedure. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(c)(2)(iv)(A) (1985); 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(b)(3)(i) (1985). See also EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 78 (1980). Without allowing for such variances, the EPA
would be charged with allowing inequities to exist within each subcategory, and the regula-
tions might be overturned. Congress has not precisely outlined how much industries must
spend in carrying out the directives of the CWA. "Until Congress is willing to state in the law
itself, and not just in the legislative history, that dischargers must comply with the established
limits or go out of business, this country's water quality will remain burdened with the ugly
consequences of the Administration's pressured discretion." Kalur, supra note 119, at 988.
One of the approved FDF variances provides a clear example of the potential for high costs.
In order for the Freeport Chemical Company plant in Uncle Sam, Louisiana to have complied
with the regulations assigned to its subcategory, it would have initially cost $27 million, with
annual operating costs of $13 million. Final Decision of the Administrator, FDF 78-01, Free-
port Chemical Company, Uncle Sam, Louisiana, NPDES LA0004847 (June 3, 1981) at 5-6.
However, the EPA only projected that the cost to plants in that subcategory would be
$500,000 initially, and $40,000 annually. Id. Other factors which the EPA will not consider
in the determination of granting an FDF variance include infeasibility to install equipment
within statutory time limits, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(e)(1) (1985); inability to achieve limits with
appropriate treatment, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(e)(2) (1985); discharger's ability to pay for treat-
ment, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(e)(3) (1985); and local receiving water quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.31(e)(4) (1985). Similar provisions exist for indirect dischargers. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(e) (1985).
148. The NRDC also criticized the EPA for the length of time it takes until a final decision
is released by the Administration. NRDC Brief at 35-36, 42, ChemicalMfrs. Ass'n. The EPA,
however, asserts that three factors make the decisionmaking procedure time-consuming. The
first factor involves the collection of technically complicated data and information on the ap-
plicant. Some data must be collected over long periods of time to assure accuracy. Secondly,
manpower is limited due to competing interests in the different offices within the EPA.
Thirdly, to research thoroughly and evaluate the request for modification properly from a
national standard, the EPA proceeds in a slow and methodical manner. Telephone interview
with Gary Hudiburgh, Jr., Attorney in Technical Support Branch of the EPA Office of Water
(July 26, 1985).
In addition, FDF variance provisions lack a stay provision, instructing plants to continue to
install the required pollutant control devices until notification of the decision. NRDC Brief at
42, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. Congress addressed these issues in recent proposed legislation by
[Vol. 35:595
Congressional Ambiguity
stricter;1 49 and the potential administrative Pandora's box that could be
opened in allowing for such variances. 5 '
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EPA's FDF VARIANCE FOR
DIRECT AND INDIRECT DISCHARGERS AND AUTHORITY To
PROMULGATE UNIFORM EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
A. Early Judicial Interpretations of Effluent Limitations
Prior to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 151 several circuit courts
had examined the scope of the EPA's authority to establish national effluent
limitations containing FDF variance provisions under the CWA.' 52 These
decisions raised two primary questions: whether the EPA Administrator
had the authority under section 301 to promulgate effluent limitation regula-
tions for direct dischargers or if the authority was to be reserved by the
individual permit issuer; and, if the EPA was found to have statutory au-
thority to promulgate such regulations, whether they should be enforced
uniformly or cover a range of limitations from which a permit issuer could
choose in granting individual limitations for dischargers.
In addressing the first issue, each court examined the language of section
301, its legislative history, and the actions taken by the EPA in implement-
ing this section. The decisions of the courts were sharply divided. In CPC
International, Inc. v. Train, 153 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the EPA did not have the authority to promulgate
setting time limits on the decision-making procedure. See infra notes 277-79 and accompany-
ing text.
149. Additionally, one commentator does not give much validity to the option of request-
ing stricter effluent limitations through an FDF variance. He does not believe that citizens or
environmental groups possess the knowledge or capability to pursue this type of litigation. See
Kalur, supra note 119, at 962 n.33.
150. Lastly, some commentators observe that allowing for FDF variances could create a
situation where "no rational basis for limitation will exist." Id. at 967 n.66. For further dis-
cussion of the negative ramifications of administrative agencies' employment of the exceptions
process, see generally Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and
the Formation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163. But see
Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L.J. 938 (1984) (in order for
administrators to perform their tasks properly they must be allowed to use their discretion in
promulgating rules); see also Aman, Administrative Equity An Analysis of Exceptions to Ad-
ministrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 227 (the broad problems addressed by agencies call for a
mechanism to bridge the gap between the collectively determined rules and the realities of each
case).
151. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
152. See infra notes 153-64 and accompanying text. For more detailed analysis of the cases
leading to du Pont, see generally Parenteau & Tauman, supra note 51.
153. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
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section 301(b) industry-wide effluent limitations.' 54 On the other end of the
spectrum, the Second,' 55 Third, 156 Seventh, 1" and D.C. 5 ' Circuit Courts
held that the EPA did have such authority under section 301(b).
The circuit courts also split as to the uniformity of the effluent limitations
promulgated by the EPA.' 59 The Eighth Circuit, in CPC International, Inc.
v. Train, 160 concluded that the EPA was to promulgate only ranges of efflu-
ent limitations for permit issuers to use in setting individual limitations for
point sources. 16' The District of Columbia Circuit in American Frozen Food
Institute v. Train162 and the Second Circuit in Hooker Chemicals and Plas-
154. Id. at 1037. The court examined the conflicting mandates in the CWA where, on the
one hand, § 306 and § 307 directly authorized the EPA Administrator to issue regulations,
while § 301 merely stated that the effluent limitations should be achieved without specifying
who should enforce the limitations. The court, however, held that the Administrator lacked
the authority under § 402 to issue actual permits, indicating that the Administrator was only
to set guidelines to which the permit issuers could refer. Id. at 1038-39. Additionally, the
court found that the legislative history supported the position that individual permit issuers
were authorized to set effluent limitations. Id. at 1039-43.
155. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976). The Sec-
ond Circuit's analysis relied on the legislative history in holding that the Administrator could
promulgate regulations. Id. at 627-28.
156. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). The court looked
to the entire statutory scheme and legislative history, which it found unclear, but inferred that
the Administrator had the authority to promulgate effluent limitations. Id. at 1036-37.
157. American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975). The court accepted the
EPA's interpretation that the Administrator had the power to issue effluent limitations. After
reviewing § 301 and the legislative history, the court found the EPA view to be "reasonable."
Id. at 452. The Seventh Circuit used the same approach as the Supreme Court did in Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n. The court asserted: "Our inquiry then is not whether the agency's interpretation
of § 301 is the only permissible one, but rather whether it is sufficiently reasonable to preclude
us from substituting our judgment for that of the agency." Id. at 450. See infra note 218 and
accompanying text.
158. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The D.C. Cir-
cuit added a new argument in favor of the Administrator's authority under § 301. The court
questioned the result that would occur if permit issuers had the discretion to set their own
effluent limitations. Id. at 129. The court predicted:
The plainly expressed purpose of Congress to require nationally uniform interim lim-
itations upon like sources of pollution would be defeated. States would be motivated
to compete for industry by establishing minimal standards in their individual permit
programs. Enforcement would proceed on an individual point source basis with the
courts inundated with litigation. The elimination of all discharge of pollutants by
1985 would become the impossible dream.
Id.
159. Compare CPC Int'l v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975) (EPA to set ranges as
guides for permit issuers), with American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1976) (holding that EPA sets uniform national effluent standards).
160. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
161. CPC Int'l, 515 F.2d at 1032; see also Grain Processing Corp. v. Train, 407 F. Supp.
96, 103 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
162. 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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tics Corp. v. Train, 163 however, held that the EPA should set uniform na-
tional effluent limitations with the FDF variance procedure taking into
account atypical dischargers."6 The courts in these conflicting holdings
used the same statutory construction analysis, yet each differed in their inter-
pretations and conclusions.
B. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train: FDF Variances
for Direct Dischargers
In 1974, eight chemical companies brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia in an attempt to clarify
the ambiguous statutory language concerning promulgation of effluent limi-
tations for point sources. 165 Under section 301, Congress directed that efflu-
ent limitations "shall be achieved" in accordance with the detailed
accompanying provisions. 166 Moreover, in section 402, Congress authorized
the EPA to issue permits and to approve state permit issuance programs.
1 67
The chemical companies construed these provisions together to mean that
the EPA was to promulgate "guidelines," not regulations, for the numerous
permit issuers to use in setting individual point source effluent limitations. 168
The EPA, on the other hand, asserted that Congress intended the EPA Ad-
ministrator to issue uniform national effluent limitation regulations for the
various classes and categories. 169 The uniform regulations would provide a
ceiling for permit issuers as to the maximum amount of discharge to be
allowed. 1
70
The district court held that, in view of other provisions included in the
CWA, Congress authorized the EPA Administrator to promulgate section
301(b) effluent limitation regulations separate from section 402 permit issu-
ance. 1 71 Subsequently, the chemical companies brought two separate ac-
tions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The first
action challenged the district court's jurisdiction to review effluent limitation
regulations issued by the EPA. 172 In the second action, the companies peti-
163. 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976).
164. Id. at 630; American Frozen Food, 539 F.2d at 131.
165. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Va. 1974).
166. Clean Water Act, § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
167. Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). See supra notes 80-82 and accom-
panying text. See also EPA v. California ex. rel State Water Resources Control Board, 426
U.S. 200, 205 (1972) (permitting the transformation of general regulations into specific obliga-
tions for dischargers).
168. 383 F. Supp. at 1248-49.
169. Id. at 1249-50.
170. Id. at 1250.
171. Id. at 1256.
172. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth
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tioned for review of EPA regulations based on the EPA's alleged lack of
authority under the CWA.' 7 3 The Fourth Circuit held that the CWA au-
thorized the EPA to issue "presumptively applicable" effluent limitation reg-
ulations, and that a variance procedure was required for new sources.' 7 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit deci-
sion in E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train. 175 In its analysis, the Court
reconciled the discrepancies among the CWA provisions, particularly sec-
tions 301, 304, and 402. The Court found that based on the use of the terms
"categories and classes" throughout section 301, Congress intended that the
regulations be based on categories and classes of dischargers rather than on
individual point sources. 176 Therefore, the du Pont Court concluded that
Congress intended the EPA to set industry-wide regulations to be applied
uniformly with allowance for variances.' 77 Rejecting the Fourth Circuit's
holding, the Court pointed to legislative history indicating that the EPA was
meant to issue more than mere guidelines17 ' and that variance from new
source performance standards would be inappropriate.1 79  However, the
Supreme Court was unwilling to evaluate the scope of the EPA's FDF vari-
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the court of appeals, not the district court,
could review procedural requirements for the EPA's promulgation of regulations under
§ 509(b) of the CWA. Id. at 1142.
173. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976).
174. Id. at 1026-28. The court reiterated the rationale of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972) that "[p]rovisions for variance,
modifications and exceptions are appropriate to the regulatory process." du Pont, 541 F.2d at
1028. The court also cited Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), and International Harvestor Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as authorities for approval of FDF variances. In both cases the
D.C. Circuit upheld variances from Clean Air Act regulations. See also NRDC v. EPA, 537
F.2d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that FDF variances are proper administrative safety
valves, and that "without variance flexibility, the program might founder on the rocks of ille-
gality"); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 81 (1975) (variance in Clean Air Act regulations
approved).
175. 430 U.S. 112 (1977). For an in-depth analysis see generally Note, Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 511 (1977).
176. 430 U.S. at 126-28.
177. Id. at 128. In drawing this conclusion the Supreme Court extensively analyzed the
cases discussed supra notes 153-64 throughout the opinion.
Vis-i-vis a statutory construction analysis, the Court held that the EPA Administrator has
the authority to adopt 1977 and 1983 uniform effluent limitation regulations, "so long as some
allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by including a variance
clause in its 1977 limitations." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the Court rejected the
Fourth Circuit's holding that the EPA should be allowed to grant FDF variances from new
source performance standards. Id. at 139.
178. 430 U.S. at 129-30. In addition, the Court discussed the impracticality of the EPA
being required to set individual effluent limitations for the thousands of potential point sources.
Id. at 132-33.
179. Id. at 137-39. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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ance provision in this case.
180
C. Congressional Intent in the 1977 Amendments for FDF Variances
Congress did not explicitly authorize the EPA to issue any variances from
effluent limitations other than those based on economic inability, section
301(c) of the 1972 amendments, and those based on water quality, section
301(g) of the 1977 amendments. The EPA and proponents of FDF vari-
ances have presented evidence that Congress was aware of these variances
even though it did not directly approve of them in the 1977 amendments.
However, opponents of FDF variances have produced contradictory facts
that cast doubt upon Congress' awareness or condonation of the EPA's vari-
ance procedure.
During the 1977 amendments debate a representative on the Subcommit-
tee on Water Resources emphasized the importance of understanding case
law that interpreted the CWA,' 8" and referred to a Library of Congress re-
port 182 that specifically included a discussion of du Pont and Appalachian
Power Co. v. Train, 183 which upheld FDF variances.' 84 Moreover, a repre-
sentative of the NRDC brought FDF variances to the attention of Congress
while testifying before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution. 8 '
Although the Supreme Court approved of "best practicable control tech-
nology currently available" (BPT) variances in the du Pont decision, the pro-
priety of FDF variances from other effluent limitations and pretreatment
standards, particularly for indirect dischargers, was uncertain. 86 Oppo-
nents of FDF variances have refuted evidence concerning du Pont and pre-
treatment standards based on the release time of each.' 8 7 The Supreme
Court decided du Pont only a short time before the enactment of the 1977
180. 430 U.S. at 128 n.19. The Court stated that "consideration of whether EPA's vari-
ance provision has the proper scope would be premature." Id.
181. 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 374. Representative Clausen stated
that "[a] full understanding of Public Law 92-500 [1972 Amendments] can only be achieved by
having an understanding of the case law interpreting the public law." Id.
182. COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., IST SESS.,
CASE LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972 at 20, 28 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as CASE LAW UNDER THE FWPCA
AMENDMENTS OF 1972].
183. 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
184. Id. at 1358-59; CASE LAW UNDER THE FWPCA AMENDMENTS OF 1972, supra note
182, at 20, 28.
185. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. Part 9 at 37 (1977).
186. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
187. NRDC Brief at 14, 21, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
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amendments.' 8 8 In 1978, the EPA promulgated final general pretreatment
regulations, which included FDF variance provisions, after enactment of the
1977 amendments.' Opponents argue that Congress had little or no op-
portunity to review these factors in order to address specifically FDF vari-
ances in the 1977 amendments.190
In addition, referring to Congress' ban of toxic pollutant variances in sec-
tion 301(l), the EPA highlighted two events of which Congress made no
mention in the 1977 amendments or the legislative history. First, BPT vari-
ances approved in du Pont applied to pollutants that Congress declared toxic
in 1977.191 Second, in February of 1977, prior to enactment of the amend-
ments, the EPA granted a BPT variance to a steam electric generating plant
for the discharge of copper, a toxic pollutant.' 92 Consequently, the EPA
argued that Congress specifically would have addressed the prohibition of
FDF variances in relation to toxic pollutants if it had so intended.' 19 3 Never-
theless, opponents have asserted that infrequent occurrences such as these,
and lower court decisions such as Appalachian, would not be of significance
regarding Congress' intent given the extensive material to be evaluated prior
to the 1977 amendments. 94
Lastly, FDF variance opponents claim that courts may not infer a non-
statutory exception, such as FDF variances, where Congress has already
provided specific statutory exceptions, such as sections 301(c) and (g). 9 5
The EPA, however, has refuted this allegation by noting that the Supreme
Court approved BPT variances even though Congress had included section
301(c) as an exception outlet in the 1972 amendments.' 96
D. FDF Variances and Toxic Pollutants: Conflicting Decisions in
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train and National Association of
Metal Finishers v. EPA
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 197 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit was the first court to address the discordant evidence
surrounding the actual intent of Congress in creating section 301(l) in the
188. Id. at 26-27.
189. Id. at 30.
190. Id.
191. EPA Brief at 30, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n at 13-16, Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n.
194. NRDC Brief at 27, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
195. Id.
196. EPA Brief at 28-29, Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.
197. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
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1977 amendments. In Appalachian, the NRDC contended that all FDF va-
riance provisions in BPT effluent limitation regulations should be eliminated
in accordance with the congressional mandate in section 301(l) prohibiting
variances for toxic pollutants.198 The EPA and the petitioner utility com-
pany asserted that Congress limited its prohibition to variance provisions
already included. 99 In addition, they argued that FDF variances do not
excuse dischargers from complying with BPT effluent limitations.2°°
Rather, the EPA gave dischargers different limitations with which to comply
based on unique characteristics which were not found in the exemplary
plants that the EPA examined during the rulemaking procedure.2°'
The Fourth Circuit held that section 301(l) did not apply to BPT vari-
ances. Relying on the Supreme Court's approval of FDF variances from
BPT effluent limitations in du Pont, the court found that applying section
301(l) retroactively, without a specific mandate from Congress, would be
inappropriate.20 2 While emphasizing the lack of clarity in section 301(l),
the court deferred to the administrative judgment of the EPA in interpreting
this provision.20 3 However, the court declined to assess the relationship be-
tween sections 301(c) and 301(l) because the variance issue under its scru-
tiny did not concern BAT effluent limitations.2°,
In National Association of Metal Finishers v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 205 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that FDF variances for toxic pollutants for indirect dischargers
were prohibited by section 301(l) of the CWA. 20 6 The NRDC and the EPA
asserted the same arguments here as in Appalachian, with some additions
because the FDF variances in question involved pretreatment standards.
The NRDC pointed out that unlike direct discharger limitations, the CWA
does not contain explicit variance provisions from pretreatment stan-
dards.20 7 The EPA based its counterargument in favor of pretreatment FDF
variances on the Supreme Court's approval of FDF variances for direct dis-




202. Id. at 1047-48.
203. Id. at 1048. The court commented, "the best that can be said for 301(1) is that it is
not clear." Id.
204. Id. at 1048.
205. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983).
206. Id. at 646.
207. Id. at 644. The Court referred to §§ 301(c), 301(g)-(h), 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 1(c), 131 l(g)-
(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), 1311(g)-(h) (1982));
§ 301(m), 33 U.S.C.A. 1311(m) (West Supp. 1983) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)
(1982)).
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chargers in du Pont.2" 8
The Third Circuit did not address the broad issue of the EPA's "inherent
authority" to grant FDF variances from pretreatment standards, but instead
the court briefly examined FDF variances in relation to section 301(l) and
toxic pollutants.209 Based on legislative history, the court construed the
word "modify" in section 301(/) to encompass FDF variance provisions.210
Conclusively rejecting the Appalachian court's contention that section
301(l) is unclear, the Third Circuit held that Congress meant to prohibit all
modifications for toxic pollutants, including FDF variances.21'
In response to the Third Circuit decision in National Metal Finishers, the
EPA withdrew all FDF variance provisions from the pretreatment regula-
tions involving the discharge of toxic pollutants.212 Moreover, both the
EPA and the Chemical Manufacturers Association, a representative of an
industry drastically affected by National Metal Finishers, petitioned the
Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit decision given the split between
the courts.
III. CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION v NRDC: THE
REALITIES OF THE EPA's IMPLEMENTATION OF CONGRESS'
AMBIGUOUS MANDATE IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,213 the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
held that the EPA's creation of FDF variances is consistent with the goals of
the CWA, and therefore, their exemption from pretreatment standards is not
prohibited.214 Writing for the majority, Justice White examined various as-
pects of section 301(l) in determining whether the Court should defer to the
judgment of the EPA in administering the statute.215 A three-part analysis
was used to identify congressional intent. This included a study of statutory
language, legislative history, and the EPA's application of section 301(1).
Due to the ambiguity of the test utilized by the majority, the dissent found
evidence sufficient to support invalidation of FDF variances for pollu-
208. 719 F.2d at 644.
209. Id. at 644-45; see also supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text. The court cited
many portions of the 1977 legislative history discussing congressional emphasis of toxic pollu-
tant discharges. Id.
210. Id. at 645-46.
211. Id. at 646.
212. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
213. 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
214. Id. at 1112.
215. Id. at 1108. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:595
Congressional Ambiguity
tants. 21 6 Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, argued that FDF vari-
ances frustrated congressional intent and should have been invalidated by
the Court.2 1 7 However, the majority deferred to the EPA's judgment based
on a recent test enunciated by the Supreme Court that enjoins courts from
substituting their own view for that of an agency that rationally and justifia-
bly implements a complex and ambiguous statute.218
A. Statutory Language: To Modify or Not To Modify
The Court in Chemical Manufacturers Association focused on pinpointing
with certainty the intended meaning of the word "modify" as used in section
301(l). Justice White examined both the language in section 301(l) and
other sections in the CWA that allowed the EPA to alter standards in regula-
tions. Relying on sections of the CWA authorizing the EPA "to revise" pre-
treatment standards from time to time,219 and the NRDC's concession that
such revisions are necessary even as applied to toxic standards,22 ° the Court
found no plain meaning of "modify. 2121 Specifically, the Court questioned
whether "modify," if broadly construed as suggested by the NRDC, encom-
passed the EPA's statutory option "to revise CWA standards." ' Justice
White reasoned that if this broad construction were adopted, sections of the
CWA allowing revisions, such as 307(b)(2), would become meaningless.223
Consequently, Justice White encountered difficulty in discerning one partic-
ular definition of "modify" designated by Congress that would include FDF
variances, yet exclude the statutorily authorized revisions. 224 Therefore, the
majority deferred to and accepted the EPA's assertion that FDF variances
216. 105 S. Ct. at 1113.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1108. The Supreme Court stated the test for courts to apply when reviewing
agency decisions in Chevron v. Natual Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
Specifically, the Court set forth two questions: (1) whether Congress has spoken on the exact
issue in question and (2) whether the agency's action is based on a permissible construction of
a statute in the case of congressional silence on the issue. Id. at 2781-82. Lastly, the Court
emphasized that a reviewing court must defer to an agency's "reasonable interpretation" of a
statutory provision when the congressional directive is implicit rather than explicit. Id. at
2782. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
219. Clean Water Act, § 307(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1317(b)(2) (1982).
220. 105 S. Ct. at 1108. During the oral argument the NRDC conceded that § 301(l)
could not be read to prohibit every type of alteration in toxic standards. Id.
221. Id. at 1108.
222. Id.
223. Id. Justice White remarked: "But it makes little sense to construe the section to
forbid EPA to amend its own standards, even to correct an error or to impose stricter require-
ments. Id. This particular factor persuaded the Court to reject the NRDC's broad meaning of
"modify" because it contradicted the congressional mandate in other CWA provisions. Id.
224. Id.
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are more like the revisions authorized in section 307(b)(2), than those in
section 301(c) and (g).
2 2 5
The dissent, on the other hand, asserted that "modify" is an unqualified
prohibition, universal in scope, against altering limitations for toxic pollu-
tants.2 26 Justice Marshall made reference to several separate statutes using
"exceptions," "variances," "modifications," "adjustments," or "exemp-
tions" interchangeably to mean "individual departures from general
rules., 22 7 The evidence applied by the dissent, however, did not altogether
advance its argument.2 28 In fact, the dissent's assertions support the major-
ity's conclusion. If "modify" is read in its broadest sense, then even the
pretreatment standard revisions, to be made at the discretion of the EPA and
explicitly authorized in the CWA, would be prohibited. This would clearly
frustrate Congressional intent. Given the ambiguity as to whether "modify"
was intended to encompass Congress' authorization for the EPA "to revise"
pretreatment standards under section 307(b)(2), the majority properly con-
cluded that the statutory language in the relevant CWA provisions did not
invalidate the EPA's interpretation of section 301(l).
B. Legislative History: Evolution of 301(1) and Congressional Awareness
of FDF Variances
Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion devoted a significant
amount of time to analyzing the CWA legislative history regarding congres-
sional intent as to the creation of section 301(l). The majority began its
examination of the legislative history by tracing the evolution of section
301(l).229 Recognizing the overall ambiguity of the legislative history, the
majority justifiably gave considerable weight and deference to two major
points the EPA claimed would support upholding FDF variances for toxic
pollutants.2 3' First, the Court noted that the discussion concerning "modifi-
cations" referred to sections 301(c) and (g), and made mention of FDF vari-
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1115.
227. Id. at 1127 n.22.
228. Other evidence offered by the dissent included the interchangeable use during the de-
bates of the terms "variance, waiver," and "modification." The dissent only vaguely men-
tioned that the words were used to "describe statutory 'modifications.' " Id. at 1127 n.22.
However, in fact, these terms were used specifically in reference to §§ 301(c) and 301(g), not
§ 301(l). See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
In addition, Justice Marshall inferred that the EPA's past use of "modification" to describe
FDF variances indicated that they are included in § 301(1). However, due to the conflict
between the directives in §§ 307(b) and 301(1), the EPA's use of "modification" is permissible
under the majority's more narrow application of the term "modify." Id. at 1127 n.22.
229. Id. at 1108-10. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
230. 105 S. Ct. at 1108-10.
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ances.23 ' Secondly, it found significance in the fact that Congress did not
specifically mention FDF variances in relation to section 301(1), particularly
in light of the evidence indicating Congress' awareness of the du Pont ap-
proval of variances.232 Therefore, the Court held that "the legislative his-
tory itself does not evince an unambiguous Congressional intention to forbid
all FDF waivers with respect to toxic materials.
2 33
Despite the evidence found in the legislative record that judicial approval
of variances in du Pont was brought to the attention of Congress during the
1977 amendment debates, the dissent did not believe that Congress' silence
constituted approval of FDF variances.2 34 Rather, it asserted that congres-
sional silence was attributable to the timing of the release of the du Pont
decision, which was shortly before enactment of the 1977 amendments, to-
gether with the small number of variances granted by the EPA prior to
1977.235 However, the dissent once again reinforced the majority's view be-
cause it can not be asserted definitively that Congress meant, in enacting
301(l), to include FDF variances within the scope of "modify" if it was not
made aware of the du Pont Court's approval of variances.2 36 Additionally,
Justice Marshall noted the interchangeable use during the debates of the
words "modification," "variance," and "waiver. '2 37 However, it appears
that these words were taken out of context, in that they were spoken during
discussion of sections 301(c) and (g).
238
C. The EPA's Application of Section 301(1)
After an extensive analysis of the EPA's subcategorization method of es-
tablishing nationally applicable discharger regulations, the Court appropri-
ately concluded that the EPA's construction of section 301(l) as allowing
231. Id. at 1109.
232. Id. at 1109 n.17. See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
233. 105 S. Ct. at 1110.
234. Id. at 1118.
235. Id. at 1120 n.12. In addition the dissent argued that du Pont only addressed BPT
standards, and not BAT or pretreatment standards. Therefore, Justice Marshall asserted that
Congress had no reason to follow this decision even if it had been aware of it. Id. at 1119-20.
The dissent, however, failed to consider that Congress, in the 1977 amendments, approved of
the EPA setting of pretreatment standards for both BPT and BAT effluent limitations. There-
fore, the Supreme Court's approval of variance in BPT limitations could also be construed as
Congress' acceptance of variance in BAT and pretreatment standards. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
236. If Congress did not know of the du Pont decision and the approval of variance in BPT
limitations then it would not have been considering FDF variances at all, particularly since no
mention was made of them while enacting § 301(1). See supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
237. 105 S. Ct. at 1127 n.22.
238. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
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FDF variances was consistent with the CWA's goals and operations. 239 Jus-
tice White discussed several factors that justified the EPA's implementation
of regulations allowing FDF variance provisions including the congressional
"uniform as possible ' 24° mandate.241 The Court identified conflicting direc-
tions from Congress that the EPA had to construe in order to promulgate
CWA regulations correctly.242 Congress instructed the EPA to ensure that
"similar point sources with similar characteristics . . . meet similar effluent
limitations"24 3 while taking into consideration the variety among plants
within each category. 2 "
The majority noted the enormous burden placed on the EPA to collect
adequate information and promulgate uniform effluent limitations within the
strict time constraints. 245 The nature and purpose of FDF variances, Justice
White asserted, is to fine-tune the rulemaking procedure by making certain
that the "necessarily rough-hewn categories do not unfairly burden atypical
plants.",246 Accordingly, the Court found that the variances did not excuse
the discharger from compliance with the uniform standards,247 but rather
assured that the diversity of dischargers is truly taken into account as Con-
gress mandated.248
The Court acknowledged that the EPA could achieve the same results by
granting similar relief during the rulemaking procedure.24 9 However, when
the means used by an agency such as the EPA are under question, deference
by courts to the agency interpretation is deemed appropriate.250 Justice
White noted that only a small number of variances were granted by the
EPA,251 and potential due process problems were avoided by including the
239. 105 S. Ct. at 1110-12.
240. See 1977 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 109, at 305. A member of Congress
indicated that the EPA should make the regulations "as uniform as possible." Id.
241. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
242. 105 S. Ct. at 1110-11.
243. Id.
244. Id. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
245. 105S. Ct. at 1105, 1110.
246. Id. at 1105.
247. Id. at 1110.
248. Id. The Court stated: "As we have recognized, the FDF variance is a laudable cor-
rective mechanism, 'an acknowledgement that the uniform . .. limitation was set without
reference to the full range of current practices, to which the Administrator was to refer.' " Id.
(citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1980)). See supra note 131
and accompanying text.
249. 105S. Ct. at 1111.
250. Id. When the means an agency employs to promulgate a congressional statutory man-
date are in dispute, generally courts will defer to that agency's interpretation. Id. See supra
note 157 and accompanying text.




FDF variance provisions in regulations.2 52 Additionally, the Court pointed
out the difference between sections 301(c) and (g) and section 301(1) based
on the dissimilarity in statutory factors considered by the EPA.2 53 Modifica-
tions under section 301(c) are granted on the basis of a direct discharger's
economic inability to meet the foreseen costs of pollution control devices
required under the CWA.254 Section 301(g) allows direct dischargers to ob-
tain modified standards if the quality of the water at the point of discharge is
not substantially affected by the pollutants.25 5 In contrast, FDF variances
cannot be granted due to either economic inability or effects of discharges on
water quality.25 6
Justice Marshall's dissent strongly criticized the EPA's application of a
supplemental mechanism to the rulemaking procedure. The dissent pointed
to legislative history that demonstrated Congress did not intend "plant by
plant" determinations of standards257 and questioned the EPA's ability to
determine whether a plant is truly unique, compared to others, after the
rulemaking procedure is completed.2 58 However, as emphasized by the ma-
jority, while some members of Congress may have indicated that the EPA
was not authorized to make this type of case-by-case judgment, 259 other
members clearly recognized the need for taking into account differentiation
within each category. 2 ° Thus, the procedure that Congress established for
the EPA to follow in fact did not have the distinct boundaries of limitation
as suggested by the dissent.
Finally, the dissent highlighted ways in which FDF variances are different
from statutory revisions under section 307(b).261 First, by individually set-
ting limitations, the environment is less protected because those plants are
not compared to other plants that are the "best" performers.26 2 Justice
Marshall illustrated this proposition in a hypothetical, based on the EPA
granting an FDF variance to an atypical plant.26 3 The new effluent limita-
252. Id. at 1112 n.25. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
253. 105S. Ct. at I111.
254. Id.
255. Id. FDF variances are unavailable on the basis of either discharger's inability to pay
for the treatment, 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(e)(3) (1985), or local receiving water quality, 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.31(e)(4) (1985). Similar provisions for indirect dischargers are contained at 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(e) (1985). See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
256. 105S. Ct. at 1111.
257. Id. at 1122-23.
258. Id. at 1122.
259. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
261. 105 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
262. Id. at 1123.
263. Id. at 1123-24.
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tion obtained through the variance only applies to that one plant. The dis-
sent contended that another plant in the same category that is also atypical
may be utilizing more cost efficient or advanced equipment, unbeknownst to
the EPA or the first plant.264 In order to eliminate this oversight of the
"best" performer among the atypical plants, Justice Marshall postulated that
the EPA should take into account all the production processes in a category,
thus allowing for more stringent and accurate limitations to be formulated at
the outset.26 5
The dissent's remedy, however, is flawed due to the number of plants and
factors to be considered and the deadlines the EPA must meet. The number
of plants the EPA must examine within each category creates a substantial
burden, particularly in view of the small staff266 and long list of factors Con-
gress directed the EPA to investigate and to evaluate.267 More significantly,
Justice Marshall neglected to contemplate the length of time the rulemaking
procedure would take if every single plant were examined. In complying
with the time schedule set by Congress,268 the courts, and the NRDC, the
EPA would be unrealistically burdened due to the complexity of the
rulemaking procedure. 269 Rulemaking would become such a lengthy pro-
cess, that dischargers would continue to pollute waters, with no limitation,
while awaiting the EPA's issuance of the specific regulations for their
category.
Secondly, the dissent argued that FDF variances may not spur the same
technological progress as statutory revisions. 270 Employing the same hy-
pothesis as before, Justice Marshall concluded that rather than obtaining the
FDF variance, the atypical plant would be forced to purchase the advanced
equipment used by the hypothetical "best" performer in the category.27'
Therefore, the dissent maintained that such situations would induce rapid
technological advancements in pollution control for production processes.272
Although Congress intended for section 301(l) and other restrictive CWA
provisions to encourage developments in pollution control, Congress itself
placed restrictions on the extent to which this was feasible. Specifically, in
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1123-24.
266. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
268. Clean Water Act, §§ 304, 307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1317 (1982).
269. Specifically, the NRDC Consent Decree set strict time limits on the EPA for the
purpose of promulgating CWA regulations and a list of toxic pollutants. See supra notes 104-
07 and accompanying text.





the revision authority of section 307(b) Congress identified situations in
which the standards may need alteration. Therefore, dischargers might not
be forced to install new advanced pollution control devices.273
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND
CONGRESS' REACTION
In the summer of 1985, each house of Congress statutorily endorsed the
Supreme Court's decision to defer to the EPA's interpretation of the CWA
with respect to the use of FDF variances for toxic pollutants through pas-
sage of differing provisions relating to FDF variances. Both the Senate
274
and the House 2 7 5 passed bills that added provisions to section 301 authoriz-
ing the EPA to grant FDF variances for both direct and indirect dischargers
of all pollutants, including toxic pollutants.2 76 The two bills, in addition to
approving of FDF variances, primarily addressed the aspects of the FDF
variance procedure that were subject to the most criticism. These included
time limits for applications, time limits for decisionmaking, limitations on
applicability of the new subsection, and cost used as a factor.
Both the Senate and House addressed the issue of the length of time
within which an application for an FDF variance may be filed. Generally,
both limited the amount of time to under one hundred and eighty days.2 77
Congress also addressed time constraints on the EPA in issuing a final deci-
sion on an FDF variance. Prior to the 1985 bills, the EPA had no set time
schedule within which to make a decision.27 8 The House and Senate, how-
ever, differed with respect to the amount of time needed for the EPA to
evaluate an application.
279
Both bills also conflicted over when the new CWA subsection should take
273. In addition, Congress identified situations where toxic pollutant dischargers did not
necessarily have to meet the stringent standards of the "best" performer by obtaining advanced
equipment based on economic ability and water quality standards. See Clean Water Act
§§ 301(c), 301(g), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), 1311(g) (1982).
274. S. 1128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as S. 1128].
275. H.R. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 8].
276. Congress approved of FDF variances, despite its refusal in 1983 to address the Na-
tional Metal Finisher Court's decision to invalidate the variance. See Hearings on Possible
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act before the Subcomm. on Water Re-
sources of the House Comm. on Public Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 2705-06, 2724-26,
2740-41, 2747-48 (1983). However, the eventual language of the final statutory provision is
unknown. A conference is expected during the second session of the 99th Congress.
277. The Senate bill only gave dischargers 120 days within which to apply. S. 1128, supra
note 274, at 10-11. The House set the time limit at 180 days. H.R. 8, supra note 275, at 55.
278. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
279. The Senate indicated that if the EPA does not act within 240 days, an application is
deemed denied. S. 1128, supra note 274, at 11. The House alloted 180 days for the EPA to
make a decision. H.R. 8, supra note 275, at 55.
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effect. The Senate intended for the subsection and its restrictions to apply
retroactively to applications still pending,28 ° whereas the House bill limited
the applicability of the new subsection to current or new applications for
FDF variances.1
8 1
Lastly, the Senate addressed the major criticism of cost being considered
as a factor in the FDF variance decision, while the House did not. The
Senate bill approved of the use of all fundamentally different factors as estab-
lished by the EPA, excluding cost.282
Although Congress may make revisions to the FDF procedure previously
followed by the EPA, in essence, the Supreme Court's decision in Chemical
Manufacturers Association was approved. The Court's deference to the EPA
was proper, even in light of the changes contemplated by Congress in the
1985 legislation, because the Court was not asked to review the EPA's
choice of procedure in granting FDF variances. Rather the Court searched
for Congress' intent in enacting section 301(l) through an examination of
statutory language, legislative history, and the rationality of the EPA's inter-
pretation of the section. The Court found that Congress intended to imple-
ment its policy on the elimination of toxic pollutants solely by prohibiting
statutory modifications under sections 301(c) and (g). The Supreme Court's
deferral to the interpretations of administrative agencies, such as the EPA,
on ambiguous congressional statutory mandates will promote the agencies'
efficacy, while spurring Congress on to be more specific with its intentions.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress' initial efforts at controlling pollution, beginning with the enact-
ment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, were decentral-
ized and ineffective. Although Congress significantly expanded the role of
the federal government in pollution control through amendments in 1972
and 1977, numerous ambiguities, specifically in section 301(1), in both the
statutory language and legislative history, produced an unnecessary burden
for the EPA in promulgating CWA regulations. These ambiguities stemmed
from Congress' reluctance to unequivocally express its intent to eliminate
the discharge pollutants in the legislation itself, regardless of the conse-
quences to dischargers. Out of necessity, the EPA created the FDF variance
procedure as a safety valve to provide an administrative remedy as well as to
prevent regulations from being judicially invalidated.
In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense
280. S. 1128, supra note 274, at 11.
281. H.R. 8, supra note 275, at 55.
282. S. 1128, supra note 274, at 10. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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Council, Inc., the Supreme Court appropriately deferred to the EPA's inter-
pretation of section 301(1) as not prohibiting FDF variances for dischargers
of toxic pollutants. The Court recognized that Congress did not clearly con-
vey to the EPA what was meant by "modify" in section 301(l), due to the
lack of legislative history and the conflict between the mandates in sections
301(l) and 307(b). Moreover, the dissent's argument for invalidating FDF
variances for toxic pollutants was substantially flawed because of its failure
to consider the time-consuming complexities of the rulemaking procedure
with which the EPA was charged. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in
Chemical Manufacturers Association reflects the trend of judicial deference
when conflict arises over an agency's interpretation of a highly technical and
intricate statute. As the judiciary properly defers to agency interpretation,
Congress will be prodded to eliminate the ambiguities in its legislation, as it
is contemplating doing in response to Chemical Manufacturers Association
through the 1985 amendments, rather than relying on the courts to redefine
its intentions.
Elaine Eichlin Henninger
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